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Abstract
We are interested in the problem of optimal commitments in rank-and-bid based auctions, a general
class of auctions that include first price and all-pay auctions as special cases. Our main contribution
is a novel approach to solve for optimal commitment in this class of auctions, for any continuous type
distributions. Applying our approach, we are able to solve optimal commitments for first-price and
all-pay auctions in closed-form for fairly general distribution settings.
The optimal commitments functions in these auctions reveal two surprisingly opposite insights: in
the optimal commitment, the leader bids passively when he has a low type. We interpret this as a credible
way to alleviate competition and to collude. In sharp contrast, when his type is high enough, the leader
sometimes would go so far as to bid above his own value. We interpret this as a credible way to threat.
Combing both insights, we show via concrete examples that the leader is indeed willing to do so to secure
more utility when his type is in the middle.
Our main approach consists of a series of nontrivial innovations. In particular we put forward a
concept called equal-bid function that connects both players’ strategies, as well as a concept called
equal-utility curve that smooths any leader strategy into a continuous and differentiable strategy. We
believe these techniques and insights are general and can be applied to similar problems.
1 Introduction
First price auction is one of the most well-known single-item auction formats. In first price auction, bidders
simultaneously submit sealed bids to the seller, who sells the item to the highest bidder at his/her bid.
The auction enjoys many desirable properties: simple, intuitive and easy to implement. Furthermore, in
symmetrical settings, the auction has a unique efficient Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) Chawla and Hartline
[2013]. This is in contrast to second price auction that may have many inefficient equilibria (e.g., for bidders
types drawn from interval [0,1], one bidder bids 1 and the others bid 0 is a BNE in second price auction).
In the meanwhile, first price auction suffers from several criticisms. For one, in complete information
settings, the auction (and its extension generalized first price auction) sometimes does not have a pure Nash
equilibrium and is practically observed to be unstable Edelman and Ostrovsky [2007], Edelman et al. [2007],
Bo¨rgers et al. [2013]. Perhaps more surprisingly, in incomplete information settings where bidders have
asymmetrical type distributions, its Bayes Nash equilibrium is extremely difficult to solve or characterize.
In fact, this has been one of the most elusive open problems in the literature of auction analysis Vickrey
[1961], Lebrun [1999], Fibich and Gavish [2011], Hartline et al. [2014]. To date, the problem has only
been known to have closed-form solutions in very specific settings such as two-bidder asymmetric uniform
distributions Kaplan and Zamir [2012], Fibich and Gavish [2012].
1
ar
X
iv
:1
50
2.
07
43
1v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
6 F
eb
 20
15
1.1 Commitment and related work
In this paper, we relax the assumption of BNE by considering an alternative solution concept: commitment
(aka. Stackelberg equilibrium) von Stackelberg [1934], von Stengel and Zamir [2004], Conitzer and Sand-
holm [2006], Letchford and Conitzer [2010]. In a Stackelberg equilibrium, a leader finds an optimal strategy
to commit to, given that a follower knows the leader’s committed strategy in advance and best responds to it.
Stackelberg equilibrium is particularly useful when one player has credibility to commit. It is well known
that commitment weakly increases the leader’s utility compared to Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, there are
efficient algorithms to compute it in basic settings Conitzer and Sandholm [2006], Letchford and Conitzer
[2010]. In fact, commitment, together with its use in security domains, has been regarded as one of most
appealing applications of game theory over the past decade (see Tambe [2011]).
The concept of commitment has been observed in the domain of auction design, even though sometimes
implicitly. Note that early bidding and sniping in online auctions (e.g., eBay auctions) can be regarded
as two forms of commitment Roth and Ockenfels [2002], Gray and Reiley [2013]. An advertiser that has a
”passive” image (i.e., rarely changes its bid, or always submits low bids) in sponsored search auctions can be
seen as another form of commitment1. Abraham et. al. study the case where there exists a super bidder that
has access to more information than others and study how this will affect seller’s revenue in an alternative
solution concept called tremble robust equilibrium. Their setting is similar to the commitment setting but
not the same Abraham et al. [2013]. Skreta considers another type of commitment where the auctioneer
is lack of credibility to reserve the item and studies how this lack of commitment affects revenue Skreta
[2006]. Our work draws close connections between commitments and collusions in certain auctions.
A closely-related parallel work is the one by Xu and Ligett Xu and Ligett [2014]. They characterize
optimal commitment for first price auction with complete information. For the incomplete information case,
they assume that the bidders’ types are drawn from discrete distributions and proof a partial property that
the commitment function can be divided into pieces. In comparison, we consider continuous distribution
settings and obtain strong/closed-form characterizations for a more general class of auctions. Our technical
approach is also different and yields new insights.
1.2 Our contributions
In this paper, we study the optimal commitment in rank-and-bid based auctions with incomplete information
(Bayesian setting). Rank-and-bid based auction Chawla and Hartline [2013] is a general class of auctions
in which bidder’s payment is decided by its own rank and bid, including first price and all-pay auctions as
special cases. Our main contribution is a general approach to solve and characterize optimal commitment
in this class of auctions, for any continuous type distributions. In particular, applying our approach, we
are able to solve optimal commitments for first-price and all-pay auctions in closed-form for fairly general
distributions settings. Our approach and results on these auctions in a sense mitigate the difficulties of
deriving a game-theoretical prediction in first price and all-pay auctions with asymmetric type distributions.
Our approach consists of several nontrivial techniques. We dedicate Section 3 to introduce the technical
contribution (our main contribution). Here, we focus on the economic interpretations of our results.
Our results on first price and all-pay auctions reveal certain striking findings: the leader bids very pas-
sively when his type is low. Even worse, he bids 0 when his type is below a threshold (depending on type
distributions). This is against the common sense in first price and all pay auctions that bidding 0 has no
chance of winning at all. However, a close scrutiny enlightens us otherwise: by committing to a passive
image, the leader (credibly) ensures the follower that he has no intention to compete when he has a low
1Observations based on communication with researcher Yicen Liu from Baidu Inc.
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type, thus effectively brings down the follower’s bid, since the follower does not know the leader’s actual
type and views the leader as a mixed strategy. As a result, the leader eventually wins the auction with less
competition when he has a high type. We also note that such passive bidding behaviors had been observed
in major search engines such as Yahoo2 and Baidu (before they switch to GSP).
Furthermore, the commitment solutions are largely consistent with the collusive behaviors studied in
first-price auction McAfee and McMillan [1992], Marshall and Marx [2007], Aryal and Gabrielli [2013],
Lopomo et al. [2011], Pesendorfer [2000]: players coordinates to bring down the prices. Our results further
suggest that such collusive behaviors are stable: the trust between the players is built on the rationality of
the follower, as well as the leader’s credibility to commit.
However, it is important to realize that the leader is not always passive and collusive. We also observe
(Corollary 6.5) that the leader sometimes overbids his own valuation! Our insight here is that by placing
aggressive bids on high values, the leader creates threat that effectively drives the follower’s bid to zero,
which guarantees sufficiently high utility for the leader when his type is in the middle.
Finally, note that, even though the leader throws the game with relatively large probability (78% in one of
our examples) when his type is small, his valuation in this case is small as well, as a result, the utility loss is
insignificant. In the meanwhile, when his type is high, even the leader suffers from a deficit by overbidding,
he does so with small probability (4% in the same example), the loss in this case is insignificant as well. The
losses on both ends are compensated by the gain in the middle.
2 The settings
We consider a single item auction with two bidders, one called the leader A (male) and the other called the
follower B (female). Bidder A has a private valuation x drawn from distribution F1 with support [a1, a2],
while bidder B’s private valuation y is drawn from distribution F2 with support on [b1, b2]. We use f1 and
f2 to denote the probability density of F1 and F2 respectively. We also sometimes write A = x to denote
the case where A’s type is x. Similar for B = y.
Leader A commits to a Bayesian strategy sA : [a1, a2] → 4R, where 4R denotes the set of bid
distributions on R. He announces this strategy and the follower B best responds to the leader’s committed
strategy via a single bid3. We follow the standard definition Conitzer and Sandholm [2006] of Bayesian
commitment that the leader only announces his strategy, i.e., the function sA(·), without revealing his actual
type. Being able to commit increases utility for the leader compared to the utility in BNE. To make this
statement concrete in our setting, consider the following example4.
Example 2.1 Both players’ types are drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. Let sA(v) = v2/2. Clearly, the follower
B must never bid more than 0.5 in this case. In fact, her utility when bidding t ≤ 0.5 is (y − t)√2t. B’s
best strategy is sB(y) = y/3. The expected utility of A is:∫ √2/3
0
(x− 1
2
x2) · 3
2
x2dx+
∫ 1
√
2/3
(x− 1
2
x2)dx = 0.2029
The first term consider the case where x is in [0,
√
2/3], while the second term considers the case where x is
in [
√
2/3, 1]. Compared to the unique symmetric BNE where each bidder bids half of the value,A’s expected
2http://webscope.sandbox.yahoo.com/catalog.php?datatype=a
3It is easy to see that it is never beneficial to use a mixed strategy for B.
4We will use first price auction as a running example throughout the paper
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revenue is 1/6 = 0.167. In other words, committing to sA increases A’s utility by 21%. Theorem 6.4 says
committing to the optimal strategy generates A’s utility 0.22, increasing by 32%.
As mentioned, our goal is to solve for the optimal sA in a general class of auctions called the rank-and-
bid based auctions. It is worth mentioning that computing optimal commitment in general Bayesian game
is NP-hard Conitzer and Sandholm [2006].
Definition 2.2 Rank-and-bid based auctions
• Allocation rule: the item is always allocated to the highest bidder.
• Payment rule: A bidder’s payment depends only on its own bid and whether it wins or not. The
payment is p(b) = pp(b) if the bidder loses with bid b. The payment is p(b) = pp(b) + pw(b) if bidder
wins with bid b. Here pp and pw are differentiable functions representing the agent’s payments for
participation and winning respectively.
Clearly, both first price and all-pay auctions belong to this class. For first price auction, pp(t) = 0 and
pw(t) = t; while for all-pay auction, pp(t) = t and pw(t) = 0.
We make a mild assumption that pp(b) + pw(b) is strictly increasing, pp(0) = pw(0) = 0, and pp, pw
are differentiable functions. Again, the two auctions mentioned above satisfy the assumption. In this paper
we define pw, pp : R → R. In fact, it does not matter when pp and pw take inputs on R− because A never
submits any negative bid. We do so only for ease of exposition.
Assumption 2.3 When B has multiple best responses, she will choose the one that maximizes A’s winning
probability, i.e., she will submit the lowest best response.
Assumption 2.4 When there is a tie, the good will be assigned to the B.
In fact, our main results do not depend on the assumptions above, as we show formally in the appendix
that neither of the assumptions is necessary.
Definition 2.5 PA[t, sA] denotesA’s winning probability when he is at type t, bidding sA(t), whilePB[t, sA]
is B’s winning probability when bidding t against A’s strategy sA. In circumstances where there is no am-
biguity, we use PA[t], PB[t] instead.
Definition 2.6 We use uA and uB to denote A’s and B’s expected utility respectively.
uA(sA) = Ex∼F1(x · PA[x, sA]− pp(sA(t))− pw(sA(t)) · PA[x, sA])
while uB can be conveniently expressed as,
uB(y) = sup
t≥0
(y · PB[t]− pp(t)− pw(t) · PB[t])
i.e. uB(y) is the largest utility B can achieve with value y. Though B’s valuation is on [b1, b2], we extend
its definition to [0, b2], and F2[x] = 0, x < b1.
Note that we use sup rather than max here because we still need to show that max is always attainable.
We do so in Lemma 4.1. We also note that bidding 0 yields a nonnegative utility for B, so uB ≥ 0 and
uB(0) = 0.
Definition 2.7 Let SB(y, sA) denote B = y’s best responses against A’s strategy sA. In circumstance
where there is no ambiguity, we use SB(y) instead.
We will prove this definition is well-defined in Lemma 4.1, i.e., SB(y) is nonempty.
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3 Approach Sketch
As mentioned, the main contribution of this paper is to put forward a general approach for optimal commit-
ments in rank-and-bid based auctions. The approach can be sketched by a few insights and steps. It is useful
to understand these insights and steps before we proceed to the details.
3.1 Difficulties of the problem
The main difficulty of the problem is that the follower’s best response cannot be represented as a closed-
form function of the leader’s Bayesian strategy (also a function). This difficulty further prevents us to obtain
a closed-form representation of the leader’s winning probability and utility. As a result, standard functional
optimization techniques do not apply. To appreciate the difficulty, it might be helpful to compare to the
problem of finding Bayes Nash equilibrium with two asymmetric bidders in first-price auction — one of the
most elusive open problems in the analysis of auctions Kaplan and Zamir [2012], Hartline et al. [2014]. The
main barrier in that literature is exactly the difficulty to represent one’s best response as a concise function
of the other’s strategy.
Furthermore, the leader’s optimal strategy is not necessarily continuous and differentiable, making it
difficult to optimize and analyze. In contrast, consider again the literature of Bayes Nash equilibrium in
first price auction: standard techniques exist to guarantee the equilibrium strategy to be monotone and
differentiable.
Previous work on this problem focuses on different cases of finding optimal commitment in first price
auction with complete information Xu and Ligett [2014]. They also discuss the Bayesian case where the fol-
lower’s type is drawn from a discrete distribution. They obtain a partial property of the optimal commitment
in the Bayesian case. Their approach and result do not extend to our continuous case.
3.2 Key innovation: representation via equal-bid function
A key insight here is to represent everything (the strategies, utilities and winning probabilities of both play-
ers) as functions of g, coined the equal-bid function, that maps a leader’s type to a follower’s type. Intuitively,
g(t) is the follower’s type at which she submits the same bid as the leader does when the leader is at type
t. In other words, g(t), later proved to be monotone, can be seen as a cutoff type between win and lose for
the follower. As one can imagine, together with the cumulative distribution function of the follower’s type,
we can represent the leader’s winning probability (hence utility) as a function of g. A similar but different
idea has appeared in Lebrun [1999] where they use inverse bid function to represent the best response of one
another.
3.3 Step one: to sort the leader’s strategy
Even with the help of the equal-bid function, we still cannot compute the optimal leader’s strategy. The
next obstacle is the optimal leader strategy might not be monotone or differentiable. So, our first effort is
to sort the leader’s strategy. We prove that, for any leader’s strategy (optimal or not), one can sort it into a
monotone function that preserves the follower’s best response without hurting the leader’s utility. In other
words, the leader always prefers the strategy after sorting.
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3.4 Step two: to smooth the leader’s strategy and the equal-utility curve
The more difficult part is to smooth the leader’s strategy, i.e., to turn it into a continuous and differentiable
function. To achieve this goal, we introduce the second innovation called equal-utility curve. Roughly, fix
the follower’s type, the equal-utility curve represents a leader’s strategy such that the follower gets the same
utility no matter what she bids. We first show that such curve always exists. Furthermore, the supremum
(over all follower’s types) of all such curves defines a new leader strategy that enjoys the following important
properties: it is continuous, left and right differentiable, preserves the follower’s best response, and weakly
improves the leader’s utility. Till now, one can truly focus on monotone, continuously differentiable leader
strategies.
3.5 Step three: bijection between the leader strategies and equal-bid functions
It turns out that we can find a bijection between the set of monotone, continuously differentiable leader
strategies and the set of continuous and monotone equal-bid functions. As a result, we can restrict attentions
to optimize over equal-bid functions and the standard Lagrangian method applies.
We conclude with a characterization of the optimal commitment for general follower type distributions
and compute the closed-form optimal commitments for both all-pay and first-price auctions when the fol-
lower has distribution uniform type distributions.
4 Sort and Smooth the leader’s strategy
We first transform an arbitrary leader strategy into a continuous weakly increasing strategy and show that
this transformation does not hurt the leader’s expected utility.
There are some additional properties (e.g., differentiability) for the transformed strategy, which we prove
in the next section
We first show that the notion of “best response” is well defined for the follower B.
Lemma 4.1 For any B’s valuation y, B has a best response, i.e. uB(y) can be attained by some bid and the
smallest bid exists among the best responses.
By Assumption 2.4, B always chooses the smallest bid among all best responses.
4.1 Sort sA
For arbitrary strategy sA, the support of sA(v) on value v may not be a single bid. Function sA could also
be nonmonotone. The following lemma says, to find the optimal commitment, it suffices to consider the
strategies with the desirable properties below.
Lemma 4.2 For any strategy sA for A, we can sort it into a new strategy function s˘A such that (1) s˘A(v) is
a deterministic bid for any v and is weakly increasing in v (2)the best response of s˘A remains the same as
sA (3) s˘A yields at least the same utility for the leader as sA.
From now on, for ease to presentation, we use s to denote s˘A. So s is an weakly increasing, nonnegative
strategy function.
The following example shows how to calculate uB in first price auction.
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Example 4.3 Both bidders’ value distribution are uniform on [0,1].
sA(x) =
{
x/4 x ≤ 0.4
x− 0.3 x > 0.4
By definition uB(y) = max{maxt≤0.1(y − t) · 4t,maxt>0.1(y − t)(t+ 0.3)}, we have
uB(y) =

y2 y ∈ [0, 0.2)
0.4y − 0.04 y ∈ [0.2, 0.5]
(y + 0.3)2/4 y ∈ (0.5, 1]
The following theorem says the set of best responses of B at type y1 generally does not intersect with
the set of best responses at type y2 and these sets are well sorted by the value of y, except for the following
special case.
Theorem 4.4 For any B’s valuations y1 < y2, if ∃a ∈ SB(y1), b ∈ SB(y2) but a > b, then SB(y1) ⊆
SB(y2), uB(y1) = uB(y2) = 0 and PB[b] = PB[a] = 0.
We can now prove that the follower’s utility is continuous an monotone.
Lemma 4.5 uB(y) is continuous and weakly increasing.
4.2 Smooth sA
To smooth sA into a continuous and differentiable function, we now introduce an important innovation of
our approach: the equal-utility curve.
Definition 4.6 Define equal-utility curve euB(·, ·): [0, b2] × (a1, a2] → R, such that euB(y, x) is the only
solution (solve for t) of
uB(y) = F1[x]y − pw(t)F1[x]− pp(t) x ∈ (a1, a2] (1)
The interpretation of euB(y, ·) is that, any value of euB(y, ·) (as a function of x) is a best response of the
follower at type y.
Consider again Example 4.3, where in first price auction, F1[x] = F2[x] = x ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. In first price
auction, the definition of euB above is simplified as
euB(y, x) = y − uB(y)
x
When B’s value y = 0.5, her best response is to bid 0.1 with utility 0.16. So uB(0.5) = 0.16, and EU curve
is euB(0.5, x) = 0.5− 0.16x , shown in Fig 1. If A uses strategy
max{euB(0.5, x), 0} =
{
0 x ∈ [0, 0.32)
0.5− 0.16x x ∈ [0.32, 1]
then the utility of B when y = 0.5 is the same for any bid in [0, 0.34].
First of all, function eu is well defined. Given x, y, when t increase, the right hand side of Equation (1)
strictly decreases( F1[x] is positive). So there exists a unique solution (maybe negative). Function eu
represents the leader’s strategy against which the follower will achieve the same largest utility no matter
what the follower bids. It’s easy to check that euB(0, ·) = 0.
The following lemma is a technical gadget, which prepares us to prove that eu function is weakly
increasing and differentiable. It’s also used in the proof of Theorem 5.9.
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Figure 1: Equal-Utility(EU) curve. When y = 0.5, the utility of bidding 0 or 0.3 are always 0.16.
Lemma 4.7 Given a > 0, (pw)′ and (pp)′ are nonnegative, (pw)′ + (pp)′ > 0. If t(a, b) satisfies
b+ apw(t) + pp(t) = 0
we can prove t(a, b) exists, ∂t∂a(a, b) and
∂t
∂b(a, b) are continuous. In particular
∂t
∂a
(a, b) =
−pw(t)
a(pw)′(t) + (pp)′(t)
∂t
∂b
(a, b) =
−1
a(pw)′(t) + (pp)′(t)
Lemma 4.8 (1)euB(y, x) is weakly increasing and differentiable in x. euB(y, x) is continuous in y. (2)euB(y, x) ≤
sA(x)
We are now ready to introduce the smooth method:create the s∗A using euB .
Definition 4.9 s∗A(x) = supy∈[0,b2] euB(y, x),∀x ∈ (a1, a2]
We will prove that strategy s∗A yields at least the same revenue for A as strategy s. The outline is
following. First, we prove that, though the leader’s bid distribution changes, we keep the utility of the
follower remain the same. Second, we prove the best response ofB is still the best response after smoothing,
for any follower’s value (Lemma 4.11). Third, we prove the leader’s winning probability does not change. At
last, combined the fact that leader’s bid is weakly decreasing, we prove that leader’s utility weakly increases
after smoothing.(Theorem 4.15)
An mathematical view of the motivation of s∗A(x) can be found in Remark 2. The idea is to suppress the
bids of the leader while maintain his winning probability.
Consider again Example 4.3,
s∗A(x) =

x/4 y ∈ [0, 0.4)
x− 0.3 y ∈ [0.4, 0.65]
1− 0.652x x ∈ (0.65, 1]
We now prove some basic properties of s∗A that will be used later.
Lemma 4.10 (1) For any x ∈ (a1, a2], (x, s∗A(x)) must lie on some EU curve.
(2) When s∗A(x) > limt→a1 s
∗
A(t), s
∗
A(x) strictly increases.
(3) When s∗A(x) = limt→a1 s
∗
A(t), (x, s
∗
A(x)) lies on euB(p
w(s∗A(x)), ·), and uB(pw(s∗A(x))) = 0,
pp(pw(s∗A(x))) = 0.
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(4) For any x, we have s∗A(x) ≤ sA(x).
(5) s∗A(x) is continuous.
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For simplicity, we use P ∗B[t] and S
∗
B(y) instead of PB[t, s
∗
A] and SB(y, s
∗
A). Next, we study how the
follower’s utility and best response would change in s and s∗A.
Lemma 4.11 (1) When A’s strategy s is changed to s∗A, uB(y) remains the same.
(2) If t ∈ SB(y) then t ∈ S∗B(y), SB(y) ⊆ S∗B(y). If P ∗B[t] 6= PB[t] then uB(y) = 0 and t =
limx→a1 s∗A(x)
The lemma below draws connections between equal-utility curve and s∗A.
Lemma 4.12 (1) If (x0, s∗A(x0)) lies in eu line euB(y0, ·), then s∗A(x0) ∈ S∗B(y0). (2) If s∗A(x0) ∈ S∗B(y0)
and s∗A(x0) 6= limx→a1 s∗A(x) then (x0, s∗A(x0)) lies in eu line euB(y0, ·).
The best response set S∗B of the follower in s
∗
A is an a superset of the SB . Remind that the best response
of the follower is sorted. So, S∗B(y) is bounded by any element in S
∗
B(y − ), and S∗B(y + ). Thus, it’s
bounded by SB(y− ), and SB(y+ ). We then prove that for most of the types, the winning probability of
the leader will not change.
If ∃x such that s∗A(x) = limt→a1 s∗A(t), define
Definition 4.13 xˆ = sup{x| limt→a1 s∗A(t) = s∗A(x)}.
Since s∗A is continuous, s
∗
A(xˆ) = limt→a1 s
∗
A(t). The following lemma tells what s is if s
∗
A has a constant
interval in the beginning.
Lemma 4.14 If ∃x such that s∗A(x) = limt→a1 s∗A(t), we have s∗A(x) = sA(xˆ) ∀x < xˆ.
Combining with the fact that the bids decrease in s∗A (thus lower payment) and still the same winning
probability, we prove that the expected utility does not decrease.
Theorem 4.15 By using s∗A instead of s, the expected utility of A does not decrease.
5 Bijective mapping between s∗A and g
The final step is to show that every s∗A can be represented by a function g and we shall restrict attention to
optimize such g instead.
Figure 2: M1 is bijective between O1 and O2
5The limitation of continuous may be non continuous, so this argument is not trivial. Consider yk(x) = kx, x ∈ [0, 1/k] and
constant zero for x ≤ 0 and constant one for x ≥ 1/k. yk is continuous but supkyk is not.
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Definition 5.1 yˆ = sup{y|uB(y) = 0}
Definition 5.2 ∀x > a1, Y (x) = {y|euB(y, ·)passes through point (x, s∗A(x))}.
Lemma 5.3 (1) Y (x) is closed. (2)Y (x) ≥ yˆ. (3)For all x1 < x2, Y (x1) ≤ Y (x2). (4)(yˆ, b2] ⊆ ∪xY (x)
(5)Y (x) is an interval or is a unique number. Y (x) contains only one element for almost all x.
Definition 5.4 Equal-bid function g(x) = minY (x),∀x ∈ (a1, a2]
The intuitive explanation of g is: when the follower’s type y = g(x), one of her best response is to equal the
bid s∗A(x) by the leader. In most of the time except for countable types, if follower gives the same bid as the
leader, then the lowest type of the follower must be g(x). In other words, the follower with value g(x) gives
the same bid as the leader with value x.
With equal-bid function, the winning probability of the leader has a surprisingly concise form, as shown
in Lemma 5.5.
Consider again Example 4.3, we have
g(x) =

x/2 y ∈ [0, 0.4)
2x− 0.3 x ∈ [0.4, 0.65]
1 y ∈ (0.65, 1]
It’s easy to check that sA(0.45) = 0.15, g(0.45) = 0.6, SB(0.6) = {0.15}. The leader with value 0.45 bids
0.15, same as the follower with value g(0.45) = 0.6.
By lemma 5.3, {y|euB(y, x) = s∗A(x)} is closed, so g(x) is well defined. When y < g(x), the leader
A = x beats the follower y by Theorem 4.4. When y ≥ g(x), the follower y beats the leader A = x by
tie-breaking rule. So we can calculate the winning probability of the leader A = x using g(x).
Lemma 5.5 Using strategy s∗A, the winning probability of A with type x is F2[g(x)].
Lemma 5.6 (1)g(x) weakly increases. (2)g is left continuous.
Note, s∗A(x) is not yet defined on a1. In fact, bid with zero probability does not affect overall utility. We
can define s∗A(a1) = limt→a1 s
∗
A(t) for convenience.
Now we prove the last a few desirable properties of s∗A: s
∗
A is differentiable on both sides. Based on the
derivatives, we determine the connection between g and s∗A.
Theorem 5.7 Assume both (pw)′ and (pp)′ are continuous, then
1. s∗A(x) is left-hand differentiable and right-hand differentiable.
2. s∗A can be solved from
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt = p
w(s∗A(x))F1[x] + p
p(s∗A(x))− pp(s∗A(a1)).
By (2), we obtain that in first price auction s∗A(x) =
1
F1[x]
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt+ s
∗
A(a1).
In all-pay auction s∗A(x) =
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt+ s
∗
A(a1).
Proof. (1) For any x0, we prove s∗A(x) is right-hand differentiable at point x0. The proof for the left-hand
case is similar.
If x2 > x0 is close enough to x0, by Lemma 5.3, we know Y (x2) is close enough to Y (x0). Denote
y0 = Y (x0) = g(x0) and y2 = Y (x2) (Y = inf Y, Y = supY ).
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Let Q(a, b) denote the solution t of
b+ apw(t) + pp(t) = 0
By Lemma 4.7, Q(a, b) exists and
∂Q
∂a
(a, b) =
−pw(Q)
a(pw)′(Q) + (pp)′(Q)
∂Q
∂b
(a, b) =
−1
a(pw)′(Q) + (pp)′(Q)
We have ∂Q∂a and
∂Q
∂b are continuous. We should also keep in mind that
∂Q
∂a and
∂Q
∂b are negative.
Since (x0, s∗A(x0)) lies on euB(y0, ·) and (x2, s∗A(x2)) lies on euB(y2, ·), we have
s∗A(x0) = euB(y0, x0) s
∗
A(x0) ≥ euB(y2, x0)
s∗A(x2) = euB(y2, x2) s
∗
A(x2) ≥ euB(y0, x2)
Rewrite these equations in terms of Q we have
s∗A(x0) = Q(F1[x0], uB(y0)− y0F1[x0]) (2)
s∗A(x0) ≥ Q(F1[x0], uB(y2)− y2F1[x0]) (3)
s∗A(x2) = Q(F1[x2], uB(y2)− y2F1[x2]) (4)
s∗A(x2) ≥ Q(F1[x2], uB(y0)− y0F1[xx]) (5)
Equation (4)-(3) and divide it by x2 − x0, we get
s∗A(x2)− s∗A(x0)
x2 − x0 ≤
Q(F1[x2], uB(y2)− y2F1[x2])−Q(F1[x0], uB(y2)− y2F1[x0])
x2 − x0 (6)
Since u and F1 are continuous, we have limx2→x0 uB(y2) − y2F1[x2] = limx2→x0 uB(y2) − y2F1[x0] =
uB(y0)− y0F1[x0].
Since ∂Q∂a and
∂Q
∂b are continuous, for any  > 0, we can pick x2 small enough such that when (a, b) ∈
[F1[x0], F1[x2]]× [uB(y2)− y2F1[x2], uB(y2)− y2F1[x0]] we have
(
∂Q
∂a
(a, b),
∂Q
∂b
(a, b)) ∈ [∂Q
∂a
(F1[x0], uB(y0)− y0F1[x0]) · (1± )]
×[∂Q
∂b
(F1[x0], uB(y0)− y0F1[x0]) · (1± )]
We use integration of the derivatives to represent the numerator of Equation (6). Since the derivatives
are very close, we can have a good upper bound.
Q(F1[x2], uB(y2)− y2F1[x2])−Q(F1[x0], uB(y2)− y2F1[x0])
=
∫ F1[x2]
F1[x0]
∂Q
∂a
(t, uB(y2)− y2F1[x2])dt−
∫ uB(y2)−y2F1[x0]
uB(y2)−y2F1[x2]]
∂Q
∂b
(F1[x0], t)dt
≤ (F1[x2]− F1[x0])(1− )∂Q
∂a
(F1[x0], uB(y0)− y0F1[x0])
−y2(F1[x2]− F1[x0])(1 + )∂Q
∂b
(F1[x0], uB(y0)− y0F1[x0])
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The inequality is because ∂Q∂a and
∂Q
∂b are negative. Then the limitation of Equation (6) would be
lim
s∗A(x2)− s∗A(x0)
x2 − x0 ≤ f1(x0)(1− )
∂Q
∂a
(F1[x0], uB(y0)− y0F1[x0])
−y2f1(x0)(1 + )∂Q
∂b
(F1[x0], uB(y0)− y0F1[x0])
Since it works for any , we have
lim
s∗A(x2)− s∗A(x0)
x2 − x0 ≤ f1(x0)
∂Q
∂a
(F1[x0], uB(y0)− y0F1[x0])
−y2f1(x0)∂Q
∂b
(F1[x0], uB(y0)− y0F1[x0])
=
−f1(x0)pw(s∗A(x0)) + f1(x0)g(x0)
F1[x0](pw)′(s∗A(x0)) + (pp)′(s
∗
A(x0))
=
∂eu
∂x
(Y (x), x)
Similarly, if we use Equation (5)-(2), we can get a lower bound same as the upper bound. So s∗A(x) is
right-hand differentiable at point x0, and
(s∗A)
′(x) =
∂eu
∂x
(Y (x), x)
(2) Following above, we have
∂+s
∗
A(x) =
f1(x)Y (x)− pw(s∗A(x))f1(x)
(pw)′(s∗A(x))F1[x] + (pp)′(s
∗
A(x))
f1(x)Y (x) = ∂+s
∗
A(x) · (pw)′(s∗A(x))F1[x] + pw(s∗A(x))f1(x)
+∂+s
∗
A(x) · (pp)′(s∗A(x))
f1(x)Y (x) = ∂+[p
w(s∗A(x))F1[x] + p
p(s∗A(x))]
Similarly, we have
f1(x)g(x) = ∂−[pw(s∗A(x))F1[x] + p
p(s∗A(x))]
Because Y (x) = g(x) for almost all x, then when we do integration on both right and left derivatives, the
difference vanishes, i.e.∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt = p
w(s∗A(x))F1[x] + p
p(s∗A(x))− pp(s∗A(a1))
uunionsq
Remark 1. Up to now, we have developed a new strategy s∗A for A based on s, with at least 2 desirable
properties: it yields at least as much utility as s and is left-hand differentiable and right-hand differentiable.
In the following, we will calculate the winning probability and find out the s∗A with the optimal utility.
Remark 2. From s (we only need the weakly increasing condition), we could define g directly, but s can-
not be calculated by g. To see this, the follower bid sA(t) and when t = x, the follower achieves the
largest utility. Take first price auction for example, we have (g(x)− sA(x))F1[x] ≥ (g(x)− sA(t))F1[t]∀t,
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then sA(t) ≥ g(x) − (g(x)−sA(x))F1[x]F1[t] , equality can be achieved by setting t to be x. Moreover sA(t) ≥
supx(g(x) − uB(x)F1[t] ) = supx euB(g(x), t), equality may not be achieved, because if we fix t first, there
maybe no corresponding x. Thus we do not have the exact formula of sA(t). If s is optimal, for the
leader’s every type, his bid should be as small as possible without changing follower’s behavior. To do this,
when sA(t) > supx euB(g(x), t), we can decrease his bid to  + supx euB(g(x), t), without letting the
follower match his bid. This is the nature the smooth method. So in the optimal strategy, we should have
sA(t) = supx euB(g(x), t), which is exact the smooth method, and we create s
∗
A to be it.
We can check the correctness of relationship between g and s∗A in Example 4.2.
When x0 ∈ [0, 0.4],
1
F1[x0]
∫ x0
a1
g(x)f1(x)dx =
1
x0
[
∫ x0
0
x/2dx] = x0/4 = s
∗
A(x0)
When x0 ∈ [0.4, 0.65],
1
F1[x0]
∫ x0
a1
g(x)f1(x)dx =
1
x0
[
∫ 0.4
0
x/2dx+
∫ x0
0.4
(2x− 0.3)dx] = x0 − 0.3 = s∗A(x0)
When x0 ∈ [0.65, 1],
1
F1[x0]
∫ x0
a1
g(x)f1(x)dx =
1
x0
[
∫ 0.4
0
x/2dx+
∫ 0.65
0.4
(2x− 0.3)dx+
∫ x0
0.65
1dx]
=
1
x0
[0.04 + 0.65 ∗ 0.35− 0.04 + x0 − 0.65] = 1− 0.65
2
x
= s∗A(x0)
Definition 5.8
O1 = {s| strategies resulted from any nonnegative strategy after smoothing, sA(a1) = 0}
O2 = {(g, sA(a1))|g is weakly increasing and left continuous and in[0, b2]}
By now, definition 5.4 gives a mapping M1 : O1 → O2. In fact, we will prove that there is a bijective
mapping between the two sets. The idea is that we construct a mapping M2 : O2 → O1 and proves that
M1 ◦M2 = I .
Theorem 5.9 There is a bijective mapping between O1 and O2.
As we will see in Lemma 6.1, the optimal strategy is in set O1, then finding optimal strategy is equiva-
lently to finding the optimal function g in set O2.
6 optimize equal-bid function g
In this section, we solve for the optimal g to derive the final form of s∗A.
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6.1 General bid-based payment
Lemma 6.1 In the optimal strategy, s∗A(a1) = 0.
Now we formalize the problem:
Maximize : uA(s
∗
A)
∫ a2
a1
{[x− pw(s∗A(x))]F2[g(x)]− pp(s∗A(x))}f1(x)dx
s.t. g ∈ [0, b2] is left continuous, weakly increasing.∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt− pw(s∗A(x))F1[x]− pp(s∗A(x)) = 0
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, the problem becomes
Maximize : uA(s
∗
A) =
∫ a2
a1
{[x− pw(s∗A(x))]F2[g(x)]− pp(s∗A(x))}f1(x)dx
+
∫ a2
a1
(
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt− pw(s∗A(x))F1[x]− pp(s∗A(x)))R(x)dx
s.t. g ∈ [0, b2] is left continuous, weakly increasing.
Rewrite the objective equation to reduce the double integral of g into single integral. We denote by L the
integrand.
Maximize : uA(s
∗
A) =
∫ a2
a1
{[x− pw(s∗A(x))]F2[g(x)]− pp(s∗A(x))}f1(x)dx
+
∫ a2
a1
{g(x)f1(x)
∫ a2
x
R(t)dt− [pw(s∗A(x))F1[x] + pp(s∗A(x))]R(x)}dx
=
∫ a2
a1
L(s∗A(x), g(x))dx
s.t. g ∈ [0, b2] is left continuous, weakly increasing.
We say g(x) is free, if g increases or decreases by a small amount on point x, g still satisfy the weak
monotone constraint and boundary constraint. In the optimal solution, when g(x) is free, we should have
the following equations: (When g(x) is not free, only Equation (7) fails to be zero)
0 =
∂L
∂g
= [x− pw(s∗A(x))]f2(g(x))f1(x) + f1(x)
∫ a2
x
R(t)dt (7)
0 =
∂L
∂s∗A
= −(pw)′(s∗A(x))F2[g(x)]f1(x)− (pp)′(s∗A(x))f1(x) (8)
−(pw)′(s∗A(x))F1[x]R(x)− (pp)′(s∗A(x))R(x)
0 =
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt− pw(s∗A(x))F1[x]− pp(s∗A(x)) (9)
Note that the last equation is not ∂L∂R , it is the partial derivative of the original objective function with respect
to R.
In general, we substitute Equation (8) and (9) into (7), and let h(x) denote ∂L∂g . Since g is left-continuous,
it’s easy to prove h is left-continuous.
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Theorem 6.2 (1)For an interval L, if h(x) > 0x ∈ L, we have
g(x) = lim
t→(supL)+
g(t) x ∈ L
Moreover, if supL = a2, then g(x) = b2, x ∈ L.
Similar, if h(x) < 0, x ∈ L, we have
g(x) = lim
t→inf L
g(t), x ∈ L
If inf L = a1, then g(x) = 0, x ∈ L.
(2)There is an optimal g such that g(x) ∈ 0 ∪ [b1, b2].
In fact, g can be derived explicitly in fair general settings, as we show below.
6.2 First price auction
In first price auction, pw(t) = t and pp(t) = 0. Equation (7) - (9) and h(x)become
∂L
∂g
= [x− s∗A(x)]f2(g(x))f1(x) + f1(x)
∫ a2
x
R(t)dt
0 = −F2[g(x)]f1(x)− F1[x]R(x)
s∗A(x) =
1
F1[x]
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt
h(x) = f1(x)(xf2(g(x))− f2(g(x))
F1[x]
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt−
∫ a2
x
F2[g(t)]f1(t)
F1[t]
dt)
Theorem 6.3 When F2 is uniformly distributed on [b1, b2],
(1)if ∀t, 2f21 (t)− F1[t]f ′1(t) ≥ 0, then optimal g(x) consists of at most 3 values.
(2) if b1 = 0, then g(x) consists of 2 pieces. When t0 = a2
∫ a2
t0
f1(t)
F1[t]
dt has a solution,
g(x) =
{
0 x ∈ (a1, t0)
b2 x ∈ (t0, a2) ,where t0 = a2
∫ a2
t0
f1(t)
F1[t])
dt
Otherwise, g(x) = b2,∀x ∈ [a1, a2].
Proof.
Let t0 = sup{t|g(t) = 0}. If t0 does not exist, let t0 = a1.
When F2 is uniformly distributed, f2(g(x)) does not change on (t0, a2], we denote it f2. It’s easy to see
that h(x) is continuous on (t0, a2].
(1)When t > t0, then by Lemma 6.1, g(t) ≥ b1, f2(g(t)) is constant.
h(x) = f1(x)f2 · (x− 1
F1[x]
∫ x
t0
g(t)f1(t)dt+
∫ a2
x
−f1(t)
F1[t]
(g(t)− b1)dt)
(
h(x)
f1(x)
)′
F 21 (x)
f1(x)f2
=
F 21 (x)
f1(x)
+
∫ x
t0
g(t)f1(t)dt− b1F1[x] (10)
((
h(x)
f1(x)
)′
F 21 (x)
f1(x)f2
)′ =
2F1[x]f
2
1 (x)− F 21 (x)f ′1(x)
f21 (x)
+ g(x)f1(x)− b1f1(x)
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Since ∀t, 2f21 (t)−F1[t]f ′1(t) ≥ 0, then (( h(x)f1(x))′
F 21 (x)
f1(x)f2
)′ > 0, then there is at most one cross for ( h(x)f1(x))
′ =
0, then there are at most two crosses for h(x)f1(x) = 0, i.e. h(x) = 0. Assume the two crosses are t1 and t2.
There are several cases that how the sign of h changes, for any case, we can prove function g consists of at
most three pieces. Take an example, we consider the following case:
h(x) =

> 0 x ∈ (t0, t1)
< 0 x ∈ (t1, t2)
> 0 x ∈ (t2, a2)
By Theorem 6.2 g(x) = g(t1), x ∈ (t0, t2] is constant and g(x) = b2, x ∈ (t2, a2] is constant. So there are
at most two pieces in g(x) in (t0, a2]. Counting the part g is zero, there are at most three pieces.
(2) Since b1 = 0, f2(0) = f2, which means h is continuous on the whole range.
When x ≤ t0,
h(x)
f1(x)
= f2x+
∫ a2
t0
−f1(t)
F1[t]
g(t)f2dt
So ( h(x)f1(x))
′ > 0∀x ∈ (a1, t0]. Moreover, h(x) is continuous at point t0. Combined Equation (10), we have
h(x)
f1(x)
strictly increases on the whole range [a1, a2]. Then equation h(x) = 0 has at most one solution. When
there is no solution, since limt→a2 h(t) > 0, it must be h(x) > 0 for whole range. Then it’s a special
subcase of the one solution case by setting t0 = a1. So we only need to consider the nontrivial case that
there is one solution for h(x) = 0. Assume
h(x) =
{
< 0 x ∈ (a1, t0)
> 0 x ∈ (t0, a2)
By Theorem 6.2, we have g(x) = 0, x ∈ [a1, t0) and g(x) = b2, x ∈ (t0, b2]. Since g(x) is left continuous,
it should be g(t0) = 0.
Then we compute the optimal breaking point t0, from h(t0) = 0, we have
t0 = b2
∫ a2
t0
f1(t)
F1[t]
dt
When there is no solution we set t0 = a1. In conclusion, when t0 = a2
∫ a2
t0
f1(t)
F1[t]
dt has a solution,
g(x) =
{
0 x ∈ (a1, t0)
b2 x ∈ (t0, a2) , where t0 = a2
∫ a2
t0
f1(t)
F1[t]
dt
When there is no solution, g(x) = b2,∀x ∈ [a1, a2]. uunionsq
Theorem 6.4 In Example 4.3, the optimal utility of the leader is 0.22. The closed-form representation of
the optimal g(x) and s∗A(x) are:
g(x) =
{
0 x ∈ [0, t0]
1 x ∈ (t0, 1] s
∗
A(x) =
{
0 x ∈ [0, t0]
1− t0x ∈ (t0, 1]
, t0 ≈ 0.567
Here x0 is actually the solution of t0 = b2
∫ a2
t0
f1(x)
F1[x]
dx.
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We should notice that the leaders bids zero 56.7% of the time. We also observe the following interesting,
even counterintuitive property.
Corollary 6.5 The leader sometimes bids above his valuation.
Proof. Consider the setting: b1 = 0, b2 = 10, a1 = 0, a2 = 2 and f2(x) = 0.1, x ∈ [0, 10]
f1(x) =
{
2/3 x ∈ (0, 1]
1/3 x ∈ (1, 2]
We compute the optimal commitment.
By Theorem 6.3, check whether there is a t0 such that t0 = 2
∫ 2
t0
f1(t)
F1[t]
dt. After considering both cases
t0 ≤ 1 and t0 > 1, we found t0 ≈ 1.3386. Then,
g(x) =
{
0 x ∈ (0, t0]
10 x ∈ (t0, 2]
Substitute in s∗A, we get
s∗A(2) =
∫ 2
t0
10/3dx = 2.2048 > 2,
So in the optimal strategy, the leader overbids his value! uunionsq
The corollary is counterintuitive and deserves a close scrutiny.
Let x0 denote the solution of s∗A(x) = x, and x0 ≈ 1.88. The leader’s strategy s∗A and winning
probability PA[t, s∗A] is listed below,
(s∗A(x), PA[t, s
∗
A]) =

(0, 0) x ∈ [0, 1.338]
(10(x−1.338)x+1 ≤ x, 1) x ∈ (1.338, 1.88]
(10(x−1.338)x+1 ≥ x, 1) x ∈ (1.88, 2]
The leader gives away positive utility when his value is low, i.e. x ∈ [0, 1.338]. Though the probability
that the leader’s value lies in [0, 1.338] is large, around 78%. However, even if the leader wins, he only gains
a small amount of utility, since his valuation is small.
The leader also sacrifices positive utility when A’s value is high, i.e. x ∈ (1.88, 2], he is supposed to
have the high utility in this case. However, the probability of the leader’s value lies in [1.88, 2] is 4%. He
only loses a small amount of expected utility.
By placing the aggressive bids on (1, 338, 2], the leader threats the follower so that she bids zero. We
say “aggressive” because the leader’s bid increases very fast in that interval. When the leader has relatively
high value, i.e. x ∈ (1, 338, 1.88], he wins deterministically with relative lower prices! It turns out that the
utility increment on this interval is high enough to compensate the decrements on the other two intervals.
6.3 All-pay auction.
In first price auction, pw(t) = t and pp(t) = 0. Equation (7)(8)(9) and h(x)become
∂L
∂g
= xf2(g(x))f1(x) + f1(x)
∫ a2
x
R(t)dt
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0 = −f1(x)−R(x)
s∗A(x) =
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt
h(x) = xf2(g(x))f1(x) + f1(x)
∫ a2
x
−f1(t)dt (11)
= f1(x)[xf2(g(x))− 1 + F1[x]]
Theorem 6.6 When f2 is weakly increasing, then optimal g(x) is a step function consisting of at most 2
values, 0 and b2, and the cut point t0 of g is the solution of b2 − t − b2F1[t] = 0. In particular, when F1 is
uniform distribution, t0 = b2a2b2+a2−a1 .
g(x) =
{
0 x ∈ [a1, t0]
b2 x ∈ (t0, a2] s
∗
A(x) =
{
0 x ∈ [a1, t0]
b2(F1[x]− F1[t0]) x ∈ (t0, a2]
Proof. Let t0 = sup{t|g(t) = 0}. If t0 does not exist, let t0 = a1.
We first consider the case when x ∈ ([t0, a2]. When f2 is weakly increasing,
h(x)
f1(x)
= xf2(g(x))− 1 + F1[x]
strictly increases by Equation (11). Then there is at most one cross for h(x)f1(x) = 0, i.e. h(x) = 0. If h keeps
positive, then g(x) should be constant b2. If h keeps negative, then g(x) should be constant 0. Assume the
cross is at t1.
h(x) =
{
< 0 x ∈ (t0, t1)
> 0 x ∈ (t1, a2)
Then g(x), x ∈ [t0, t1) is constant zero and g(x), x ∈ [t1, a2] is constant b2. Otherwise we can decrease
g(x), x ∈ (t0, t1) and increase g(x), x ∈ (t1, a2]. Contradicts to g is optimal.
Consider the case when x ∈ [a1, t0]. We have t0 = t1. So there are at most two pieces in g(x) in [a1, a2].
Now we compute optimal t0. Since the case for g has only one value can be seen a sub-special case of
the two values, we only need to consider the two values case. We first compute s∗A,
s∗A(x) =
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt =
{
0 x ∈ [a1, t0)
(F1[x]− F1[t0]) x ∈ [t0, a2]
Then the leader’s expected utility is
uA(s
∗
A) =
∫ a2
a1
f1(x)[xF2[g(x)]− s∗A(x)]dx
=
∫ a2
t0
f1(x)[x− F1[x]b2 + F1[t0]b2]dx
=
∫ a2
t0
f1(x)[x− F1[x]b2]dx+ F1[t0]b2[1− F1[t0]]
The derivative of the utility with respect to t0 is
f1(t0)[b2 − t0 − b2F1[t0]]
Then optimal t0 must be the solution of b2 − t− b2F1[t] = 0, and it’s unique. uunionsq
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A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.1.
Suppose otherwise uB(y) cannot be attained. Since the domain is bounded, by the definition of uB(y),
there exists t0, such that:
∃{tn} → t0, s.t. lim[y · PB[tn]− pp(tn)− pw(tn) · PB[tn]] = uB(y)
By tie-breaking rule, we have limPB[tn] ≤ PB[t0]. Since uB(y) ≥ 0, we have lim(y − pw(tn)) ≥ 0.
uB(y) = lim[(y − pw(tn))PB[tn]− pp(tn)] ≤ (y − pw(t0)) · PB[t0]− pp(t0) ≤ uB(y)
Hence, uB(y) = (y − pw(t0)) · PB[t0]− pp(t0), i.e. uB(y) can be attained by bid t0.
Next we prove the smallest best response exists. Suppose otherwise there is no smallest best response,
then among all the best responses, there exists t, such that
∃{tn} → t s.t. uB(y) = lim y · PB[tn]− pp(tn)− pw(tn) · PB[tn] ∀n
By same argument as above, we know
uB(y) = y · PB[t]− pp(t)− pw(t) · PB[t]
i.e. t is the smallest best response, contradiction. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.2.
It is important to note that, from the follower’s perspective, she only cares about the overall distribution
of the leader’s bids induced by his strategy: as long as the distribution of A’s bids is unchanged, B’s best
response remain unchanged. Our idea is then to rearrange (sort) the leader’s bids without changing the
underlying distribution.
For any strategy sA, we fix the bids distribution D, i.e. the distribution of sA(v), v ∼ F1, and rematch
the leader’s valuations to bids and create some new strategy s˘A. So the distribution of s˘A(v), v ∼ F1, is
same as distribution of sA(v), v ∼ F1. In this process, the follower’s best response remain unchanged,
hence (2). In addition, her bid distribution is also fixed. As a result, for any single bid of A, the probability
of winning is also the same. As a result, the overall winning probability is also unchanged.
Now look at the rank-and-bid based payment function, the leader’s expected payment is:∫
t∼D
Pr[t, sA]p
w(t) + pp(t)dt
=
∫
t∼D
Pr[t, sA]p
w(t) + pp(t)dt
also unchanged after rematching.
To improve the leader’s expected utility, which equals expected social welfare minus expected payment
(fixed) we only need to increase the expected social welfare, given that the overall winning probability is
fixed. Therefore, in rematching, we sort the strategy monotonically such that higher valuation with higher
winning probability, i.e., higher bid. In this way, we guarantee the total amount of fixed winning probability
is allocated to the highest types, thus yields the highest expected social welfare. From the reasoning above,
we conclude that the leader’s expected utility weakly increases, hence (3).
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The above process can be thought of as rematching a bid that is in the top q quantile of the bid distribution
to a type that is in the top q of the type distribution, for all q. So there is no mixed strategy at any type, i.e.,
s˘A(v) is deterministic ∀v, hence (1). 2
Proof of Theorem 4.4.
According to the definition of u:
uB(y1) = y1 · PB[a]− pp(a)− pw(a) · PB[a] ≥ y1 · PB[b]− pp(b)− pw(b) · PB[b] (12)
uB(y2) = y2 · PB[b]− pp(b)− pw(b) · PB[b] ≥ y2 · PB[a]− pp(a)− pw(a) · PB[a] (13)
⇒ (y2 − y1)[PB[b]− PB[a]] ≥ 0 (12)+(13)
⇒ PB[b] = PB[a] (12) and (13) become equalities.
Substitute the last equality into the Equality (12), we get pp(a) + pw(a)PB[a] = pp(b) + pw(b)PB[b].
Because pp(a) + pw(a) > pp(b) + pw(b), it must be PB[b] = PB[a] = 0.
a, b < sA(x) ∀x > a1 (14)
Furthermore uB(y1) = uB(y2) = 0 and pp(a) = pp(b).
Since we can set a to be any element in SB(y1) as long as a > b, then we have ∀a s.t. b < a ∈ SB(y1),
we have PB[a] = 0 and pp[a] = 0. Since PB and pp are weakly increasing, then they are true for all
a ∈ SB(y1). So the follower can achieve the largest utility 0 by bidding a, i.e. a ∈ SB(y2). Hence
SB(y1) ⊆ SB(y2). 2
Proof of Lemma 4.5.
We first prove uB(y) is weakly increasing. For any y1 < y2, if uB(y1) = uB(y2) = 0, the lemma is
correct. Otherwise, pick b1 ∈ SB(y1), b2 ∈ SB(y2). According to Theorem 4.4, we have b1 ≤ b2. By
definition of u, we have
uB(y2) ≥ (y2 − pw(b1))PB[b1]− pp(b1) ≥ (y1 − pw(b1))PB[b1]− pp(b1) = uB(y1)
So, uB(y) is weakly increasing. Next we prove the continuity. For any y1 < y2, we have
uB(y2)− uB(y1)
≤ (y2 − pw(b2))PB[b2]− pp(b2)− (y1 − pw(b2))PB[b2] + pp(b2)
= (y2 − y1)PB[b2]
≤ y2 − y1
For ∀ > 0, as long as y2 ∈ (y1 − , y1 + ), we have |uB(y2)− uB(y1)| < . Thus, uB(y) is a continuous
function. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.7.
First, notice that pw(t)a+ pp(t) strictly increases, so solution t exists.
Second, t(a, b) is continuous. Suppose not, let t(a, b) jumps at point (a, b). Then apw(t) + pp(t) + b
jumps at (a, b), it could not always be zero, contradiction.
Third, t(a, b) is differentiable. Suppose otherwise, t(a, b) do not have partial derivatives with respect to
a, at point (a0, b0). Then
∃k1 > k2, {a˜i}, {ai} → a0
s.t. t(a˜i, b0) ≥ t(a0, b0) + k1(a˜i − a0)
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t(ai, b0) ≤ t(a0, b0) + k2(ai − a0)
0 ≥ pw(t(a, b0) + k1(a˜i − a))a˜i + pp(t(a) + k1(a˜i − a0)) + b0 (15)
0 = pw(t(a0, b0))a0 + p
p(t(a0, b0)) + b0 (16)
0 ≥ pw(t(x) + k1(xi − x))F1[xi] + pp(t(x) + k1(xi − x)) (15)− (16)
0 ≥ pw(t(a, b0) + k1(a˜i − a))a˜i − pw(t(a0, b0))a0
pp(t(a) + k1(a˜i − a0))− pp(t(a0, b0))
Divide ai − a0 on both sides and consider the limitation when i approaches infinity, we have
0 ≥ (pw)′(t(a0, b0))k1a0 + pw(t(a0, b0)) + (pp)′(t(a0))k1
Similarly, we have
0 ≤ (pw)′(t(a0, b0))k2a0 + pw(t(a0, b0)) + (pp)′(t(a0))k2
These two equations together contradicts to the fact k1 > k2 and (pw)′ + (pp)′ > 0. So t(a, b) is differen-
tiable.
We differentiate b+ apw(t) + pp(t) = 0 on a and b, we have
(pp)′(t)t′a + (p
w)′(t)t′aa+ p
w(t) = 0
1 + (pw)′(t)t′ba+ p
w(t)t′b = 0
Since t,(pw)′ and (pp)′ is continuous, it’s easy to see these two derivatives are continuous. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.8.
(1)Let a = F1[x], b = uB(y)−F1[x]y, t = euB(a, b), then a, b is differentiable in x, and b is continuous
in y. Fix y and let t(x) = euB(y, x), then by Lemma 4.7,
∂eu
∂x
(y, x) =
∂t
∂a
(a, b) · ∂a
∂x
(x, y) +
∂t
∂b
(a, b) · ∂b
∂x
(x, y)
= =
1
a(pw)′(eu) + (pp)′(eu)
[−pw(eu)f1(x) + (−1)(−f1(x))y]
=
f1(x)y − pw(euB(y, x))f1(x)
(pw)′(euB(y, x))F1[x] + (pp)′(euB(y, x))
∂eu
∂x (y, x) is continuous for both two arguments y and x when f1, (p
w)′, (pp)′ are continuous.
If euB(y, x) has a breaking point y0, then consider the definition of euB(y, x) uB(y) − F1[x]y =
−pw(euB(y, x))F1[x] − pp(euB(y, x)). The right hand side has a breaking point y0, while the left hand
side is continuous, contradiction. So euB(y, x) is continuous in y. (2)If ∃x, y s.t. euB(x, y) > sA(x), then
consider the follower with type y bids sA(x):
uB(y) ≥ (y − pw(sA(x)))F1[x]− pp(sA(x))
> yF1[x]− pp(euB(y, x))− pw(euB(y, x))F1[x]
which contradicts to the definition of euB(x, y). 2
Proof of Lemma 4.10.
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(1)First we prove (x, s∗A(x)) must lie on some EU line. Suppose not, there exists a series number
{yn} → y0, s.t. s∗A(x) = limn→∞ euB(yn, x). Then
uB(yn) = F1[x](yn − pw(euB(yn, x)))− pp(euB(yn, x))
We choose the limitation and get
uB(y0) = F1[x](y0 − pw(s∗A(x)))− pp(s∗A(x))
So (x, s∗A(x)) is on EU line euB(y0, ·).
(2) Because euB(y, ·) weakly increases and s∗A(x) = supy∈[0,b2] euB(y, x). So s∗A(x) weakly increases.
For any x1 < x2, s.t. s∗A(x1) = s
∗
A(x2). Suppose (x1, s
∗
A(x1)) lies on euB(y1, ·). Since euB(y, ·)
weakly increases, euB(y1, x1) = euB(y1, x2) = s∗A(x1). Substitute in Equation (1), we get p
w(s∗A(x1)) =
y1, pp(s∗A(x1)) = 0 and uB(y1) = 0.
Furthermore, we get euB(y1, ·) = s∗A(x1) = s∗A(x2). Because s∗A weakly increases, then s∗A(x) =
s∗A(x1)∀x ∈ (a1, x2], i.e., s∗A(x1) = limt→a1s∗A(t).
Hence if s∗A(x) > limt→a1 s
∗
A(t), s
∗
A(x) strictly increases.
In particular, uB(s∗A(x)) = 0. Moreover s
∗
A(x1) is always the solution of Equation (1) for y1 and
x ∈ (a1, x1]. Because s∗A(x) = supy ue(y, x) ≥ euB(y1, x) = s∗A(x2), x ∈ (a1, x2] so s∗A(x2) =
limt→a1 s∗A(t). That is to say when s
∗
A(x) > limt→a1 s
∗
A(t), s
∗
A(x) strictly increases.
(3)When s∗A(x) = limt→a1 s
∗
A(t), ∃x1 < x2 = x such that s∗A(x1) = s∗A(x2). Then from (2.1), we
know s∗A(x) lies on euB(y1, ·), where y1 = pw(s∗A(x1)). Moreover, uB(y1) = 0 and pp(y1) = 0.
(4) By Lemma 4.8, we know euB(y, x) ≤ sA(x). We get s∗A(x) = supy euB(y, x) ≤ sA(x) directly.
(5)At last we prove s∗A(x) is continuous. Suppose not, there is a breaking point x and a difference d > 0,
s.t. ∀ > 0, s∗A(x+ )− s∗A(x2 − ) > d. Say (x+ , s∗A(x+ )) lies on curve euB(y(), x). Then
uB(y()) = y()F1[x+ ]− pp(s∗A(x+ ))− pw(s∗A(x+ ))F1[x+ ] (17)
uB(y()) = y()F1[x− ]− pp(euB(y(), x− ))− pw(euB(y(), x− ))F1[x− ]
> y()F1[x− ]− pp(s∗A(x+ )− d)− pw(s∗A(x+ )− d)F1[x− ] (18)
(17)-(18), we get
y()(F1[x+ ]− F1[x− ]) > pp(s∗A(x+ )) + pp(s∗A(x+ )− d)
+[pw(s∗A(x+ )) + p
w(s∗A(x+ )− d)]F1[x− ] (19)
When → 0, lhs of (18) approaches zero, but rhs is strictly larger than zero. So s∗A(x) is continuous. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.11.
(1)On one side, because s∗A(x) ≤ sA(x), the follower’s utility does not decrease no matter what the
follower’s value is. On the other side, because s∗A(x) ≥ euB(y, x), the follower’s utility does not increase
when the follower’s value is y. Since the inequality holds for any y, the follower’s utility does not increase
no matter what the follower’s value is. So the follower’s utility is the same when the leader’s strategy is
sA(x) or s∗A(x).
(2)Pick ∀t ∈ SB(y), we have
uB(y) = (y − pw(t))PB[t]− pp(t) ≤ (y − pw(t))P ∗B[t]− pp(t) ≤ uB(y)
The first inequality is because s ≥ s∗A. The second inequality is because the follower’s utility is still uB(y)
when the leader adopts s∗A. Then these two inequalities are actually equalities. Hence t ∈ S∗B(y) and
SB(y) ⊆ S∗B(y).
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Moreover, we have (y − pw(t))PB[t] = (y − pw(t))P ∗B[t]. If PB[t] 6= P ∗B[t], it must be y = pw(t).
Since uB(y) ≥ 0, we have pp(t) = 0 and thus uB(y) = 0.
If t > limx→a1 s∗A(x), we can bid t˜ which is a little smaller than t, s.t. P
∗
B[t˜] > 0, p
w[t˜] < y,pp(t˜) =
0, then the follower can achieve positive utility by bidding t˜, i.e.uB(y) > 0, contradiction. Hence t =
limx→a1 s∗A(x). 2
Proof of Lemma 4.12.
(1)P ∗B[s
∗
A(x0)] ≥ F1[x0], the follower with value y0 can achieve uB(y0) by bidding s∗A(x0). So
s∗A(x0) ∈ S∗B(y0).
(2)
uB(y0) = (y0 − pw(s∗A(x0)))P ∗B[s∗A(x0)]− pp(s∗A(x0))
= (y0 − pw(s∗A(x0)))F1[x0]− pp(s∗A(x0))
So euB(y0, x0) = s∗A(x0) by definition. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.14.
Suppose otherwise, ∃x1 < xˆ, such that sA(x1) 6= s∗A(xˆ). By Lemma 4.10, we know it must be sA(x1) >
s∗A(xˆ).
By Lemma 4.11, we have euB(y0, ·) = s∗A(xˆ), uB(y0) = 0, where y0 = pw(s∗A(xˆ)). For any  > 0, we
have uB(y0 + ) > 0.
Let η = sA(x1)−s∗A(xˆ). By Lemma 4.8, euB(y, a2) is continuous in y. So as long as  is small enough,
we have euB(y0 + , a2) < euB(y0, a2) + η = sA(x1)
Pick any t ∈ SB[y0 + ], we have
uB(y0 + ) = (y0 + − pw(t))PB[t]− pp(t)
≤ y0 + − pw(t)− pp(t)
On the other side, by definition of euB(y0+, ·), we have y0+−pw(euB(y0+, a2))−pp(euB(y0+, a2)) =
uB(y0 + ) Then we get t ≤ euB(y0 + , a2) < sA(x1).
By Theorem 4.4, since s∗A(xˆ) ∈ S∗B(y0), t ∈ SB(y0 + ) ⊆ S∗B(y0 + ), we have s∗A(xˆ) ≤ t.
Hence we have PB[t] ≤ F1[xˆ], then reconsider the utility when bidding t:
uB(y0 + ) = (y0 + − pw(t))PB[t]− pp(t)
≤ (y0 + − pw(t))F1[x1]− pp(t)
< (y0 + − pw(s∗A(xˆ)))F1[xˆ]− pp(s∗A(xˆ))
≤ uB(y0 + )
Contradiction. So the supposition is wrong. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.15.
For A’s any value x0 > 0, we consider the utility change between strategy s and strategy s∗A. We prove
the number of types, at which A’s utility decreases, is countable, so the loss on these values is negligible and
the total expected utility does not decrease.
(1)When s∗A(x0) = limt→a1s
∗
A(t) and x0 6= xˆ.
By Lemma 4.10, (x0, s∗A(x0)) lies on euB(y0, ·), where y0 = pw(s∗A(x0)) and uB(y0) = 0.
By Lemma 4.14, we have {
sA(x) = s
∗
A(x) = s
∗
A(xˆ) x < xˆ
sA(x) ≥ s∗A(x) > 0 x > xˆ
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(1.1)When the follower’s type y ≤ y0.
We have uB(y) = 0, pw(s∗A(xˆ)) > y, and PB(s
∗
A(xˆ)) = P
∗
B(sA(xˆ)) > 0. If the follower bids s
∗
A(xˆ), he
will get negative utility. So s∗A(xˆ) /∈ SB(y). Since PB[s∗A(xˆ)] = P ∗B[s∗A(xˆ)] = F1[x] > 0 by Theorem 4.4,
s∗A(xˆ) > S
∗
B(y), and s
∗
A(xˆ) > SB(y).
So the leader wins the good with value x0 when the follower has value y < y0 in both s and s∗A strategies.
(1.2)When the follower’s type y > y0.
When using s∗A, ∀y > y0, the follower can just bid s∗A(x0) then achieve a positive utility, so uB(y) > 0.
By Theorem 4.4, we have S∗B(y) ≥ s∗A(xˆ) Then S∗B(y) ≥ s∗A(xˆ). So the follower with value y > y0
wins the good when the leader has value x0 in both s and s∗A strategies.
Combined (1.1) and (1.2), the leader’s winning probability is always F2[y0].
(2) When s∗A(x0) 6= limt→a1 s∗A(t)
Let euB(y0, ·) be an eu curve that contain point (x0, s∗A(x0)). Then s∗A(x0) ∈ S∗B(y0), by Lemma 4.12
Let euB(y1, ·) be a eu line that does not contain point (x0, s∗A(x0)).
(2.1) When y1 < y0,
(2.1.1)We want to prove when A adopts s∗A, B = y1 always loses against A = x0. Otherwise, ∃t ∈
S∗B(y1) s.t. s
∗
A(x0) ≤ t.
If s∗A(x0) < t. P
∗
B[s
∗
A(x0)] = P
∗
B[t] by Equation (14) in Theorem 4.4. Because s
∗
A(x0) strictly increases
and s∗A(x0) < t, contradiction.
If s∗A(x0) = t. Then s
∗
A(x0) ∈ S∗B(y1). By Lemma 4.12, we have (x0, s∗A(x0)) lies on euB(y1, ·),
contradiction.
(2.1.2)We want to prove when A adopts s, B = y1 always loses against A = x0. Otherwise, ∃t ∈
SB(y1) s.t. t ≥ sA(x0).
By Lemma 4.12, s∗A(x0) /∈ S∗B(y1)(o.w. (x0, s∗A(x0)) lies on euB(y1, ·)).
Then s∗A(x0) /∈ SB(y1) by Lemma 4.11. Thus t 6= s∗A(x0). Since t ≥ sA(x0) ≥ s∗A(x0), we have
t > s∗A(x0).
Notice that t ∈ S∗B(y1) and s∗A(x0) ∈ S∗B(y0), we have P ∗B[t] = P ∗B[s∗A(x0)] by Theorem 4.4. That
contradicts to t > s∗A(x0) > limt→a1 s
∗
A(t).
Combined (2.1.1) and (2.1.2), the leader with x0 beats follower with y ≤ y0 in both s∗A and s.
(2.2) When y1 > y0.
(2.2.1) We want to prove when A adopts s∗A, B = y1 always beats A = x0. By Lemma 4.12, we have
s∗A(x0) ∈ S∗B(y0) and s∗A(x0) /∈ S∗B(y1). By Lemma 4.11, we have s∗A(x0) /∈ SB(y1).
Since y1 > y0 and S∗B(y0) * S∗B(y1), we have S∗B(y1) ≥ s∗A(x0) 6by Theorem 4.4. So the follower
with value y1 beats the leader with value x0 in strategy s∗A.
(2.2.2) We want to prove whenA adopts s,B = y1 always beatsA = x0. Otherwise, ∃t ∈ SB(y1) s.t. t <
sA(x0). Continue the proof above, since SB(y1) ⊆ S∗B(y1), we have SB(y1) > s∗A(x0). We then get
F1[x0] < P
∗
B[t] = PB[t] ≤ F1[x0]
A contradition. The first inequality is for t > s∗A(x0). The second equality is for Lemma 4.11. The third
inequality is for t < sA(x0).
Combined (2.2.1) and (2.2.2), when y1 > y0, the leader with x0 loses against the follower with y1 in
both s∗A and s.
(3)When s∗A(x0) 6= limt→a1 s∗A(t) and lies on a unique euB(y0, ·), then the leader’s winning probability
is same in both s∗A and s strategies.
6Here we mean any element in set S∗B(y1) is larger than s
∗
A(x0).
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When s∗A(x0) = limt→a1 s
∗
A(t) and x0 6= sup{x|s∗A(x) = limt→a1 s∗A(t)} then the leader’s winning
probability is same in both s∗A and s strategies.
In these two cases, because of s∗A ≤ s and the same winning probability, the expected utility of the
leader weakly increases when changing from s to s∗A.
In other cases, the leader’s expected utility might decrease, but however the loss on all these points is
negligible.
Define V1 as follows, we only need to prove #V1, the size of set, is countable.
V1 = {(x, s∗A(x))|point p(x, s∗A(x))lies on at least two eu lines, and s∗A(x) > lim
t→a1
s∗A(t)}
Pick arbitrary x0 ∈ V1, let euB(y1, ·) and euB(y2, ·) where y1 < y2, be two eu lines that pass point
(x0, s
∗
A(x0)). By Lemma 4.12, s
∗
A(x0) ∈ S∗B(y1), S∗B(y2).
For any y3 > y1,
uB(y3) ≥ (y3 − pw(s∗A(x0)))F1[x0]− pp(s∗A(x0))
> (y1 − pw(s∗A(x0)))F1[x0]− pp(s∗A(x0)) = uB(y1)
So uB(y3) > 0. Then consider ∀y3 ∈ Qs.t.y1 < y3 < y2, we have uB(y2), uB(y3) > 0.
By Theorem 4.4, we have
SB(y1) ≤ SB(y3) ≤ SB(y2)
So SB(y3) = {s∗A(x0)}, i.e., s∗A(x0) is the unique best response ofB = y3. Now we can map any element in
V1 to a rational number. Since s∗A(x0) is the unique best response ofB = y3, this mapping is injective. Thus
#V1 is countable. Because the leader has continuous and no mass point distribution, the loss on countable
point is negligible. 2
Proof of Lemma 5.3.
(1)If Y (x) is not closed, then ∃{yn} → y such that
uB(yn) = (yn − pw(s∗A(x)))F1[x]− pp(s∗A(x))
When n approaches infinity, we get
uB(y) = (y − pw(s∗A(x)))F1[x]− pp(s∗A(x))
Then euB(y, ·) passes point (x, s(x)), so y ∈ Y (x).
(2)If ∃y1 < yˆ such that y1 ∈ Y (x), then
0 = uB(y1) = (y1 − pw(s∗A(x)))F1[x]− pp(s∗A(x))
< (yˆ − pw(s∗A(x)))F1[x]− pp(s∗A(x)) ≤ uB(yˆ)
Which contradicts to uB(yˆ) = 0.
(3)Suppose not, then ∃y1 ∈ Y (x1), y2 ∈ Y (x2), such that y1 > y2. Now, we have
s∗A(x1) ∈ S∗B(y1)
s∗A(x2) ∈ S∗B(y2)
s∗A(x1) < s
∗
A(x2)
By equation (14) in Theorem 4.4, we haveP ∗B[s
∗
A(x1)] = P
∗
B[s
∗
A(x2)] = 0, which contradicts toP
∗
B[s
∗
A(x1)] ≥
F1[x1].
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(4)Pick any y > yˆ, let t ∈ S∗B(y). Obviously, t ≤ s∗A(a2). Since uB(y) > 0, we have P ∗B(t) > 0, which
leads t ≥ limx s∗A(x).
(4.1)When t > limx s∗A(x).
Because s∗A is continuous and t ≤ s∗A(a2), there exists x0 such that s∗A(x0) = t ∈ S∗B(y). By
Lemma 4.12, we have (x0, s∗A(x0)) lies on euB(y, ·).
(4.2)When t = limx s∗A(x).
Let x0 = F−11 [P
∗
B[t]], then s
∗
A(x0) = t.
uB(y) = (y − pw(t))P ∗B[t]− pp(t)
= (y − pw(s∗A(x0)))F1[x0]− pp(s∗A(x0))
So (x0, s∗A(x0)) lies on euB(y, ·).
Combined (4.1) and (4.2), we know euB(y, ·) has common point with s∗A(x). So ∀y > yˆ, there exists x
such that s∗A(x) ∈ S∗B(y). Hence, ∪xY (x) covers (yˆ, b2].
(5)If Y (x) is not a unique number. Then there exists y1 < y2 ∈ Y (x). For any y ∈ (y1, y2).
Y (x1) < y < Y (x2) ∀x1 < x < x2
Because conclusion in (4), it must be y ∈ Y (x). So Y (x) is an interval.
Since there is countable non-overlap interval, so for almost all x, Y (x) contains only one element. 2
Proof of Lemma 5.5.
We consider two cases.
(1)s∗A(x) = limt→a1 s
∗
A(t)
By Lemma 4.10, (x, s∗A(x)) lies on euB(y0, ·), where y0 = pw(s∗A(x)), uB(y0) = 0. Furthermore,
∀y > y0, we have uB(y) > 0(by just bidding s∗A(x)). So yˆ = y0.
Because yˆ ∈ Y (x) and Y (x) ≥ yˆ, we have g(x) = minY (x) = yˆ. Then for y ≤ g(x), the follower
bids zero. For y > g(x), the follower bids larger than s∗A(x)(o.w. the winning probability is zero, which
leads to zero utilty.) So the winning probability of the leader with value x is F2[g(x)].
(2)s∗A(x) > limt→a1 s
∗
A(t) By Lemma 4.12, if (x, s
∗
A(x)) does not lie on euB(y, ·), then s∗A(x) /∈ S∗B[y].
(2.1)When g(x) > yˆ
Since uB(g(x)) > 0, then by Theorem 4.4, we have
S∗B(y1) ≤ S∗B(g(x)) ≤ S∗B(y2) y1 < g(x) < y2
Then S∗B(y1) < s
∗
A(x) ≤ S∗B(y2). Hence, bidding s∗A(x), the leader’s winning probability is F2[g(x)].
(2.2)When g(x) = yˆ
By definition of yˆ, we have uB(y) > 0 for all y > yˆ. By Theorem 4.4, we have g(x) ≤ S∗B(y). For
y > g(x), the follower bids larger than s∗A(x). For y ≤ g(x), the follower bids zero. So the winning
probability of the leader with value x is F2[g(x)]. 2
Proof of Lemma 5.6.
(1) By Lemma 5.3(3), we know g(x) weakly increases.
(2)Suppose not, then there exists x0 and d such that ∀x < x0, g(x) < g(x0) − d. By Lemma 5.3(4),
pick any y ∈ (g(x0)− d, g(x0)), there exists x1 such that y ∈ Y (x1). Then x1 < x0, we also have:
g(
x1 + x0
2
) ≥ supY (x1) ≥ y > g(x0)− d
Which contradicts to the supposition. 2
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Proof of Theorem 5.9.
Look at Fig 5, M2 is a mapping from g ∈ O2 to s ∈ O1, define s = M2(g) be the solution of∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt = p
w(sA(x))F1[x] + p
p(sA(x)) (20)
(1) We prove that sA(x) does not change after sorting and smoothing, i.e. M2(g) ∈ O1.
Let a = F1[x], b = −
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt, sA(x) = t(a(x), b(x)). By Lemma 4.7, sA(x) is unique and
differentiable. Since g weakly increases, by Equation (20), g(x)F1[x] ≥ pw(sA(x))F1[x]. Furthermore,
g(x) ≥ pw(sA(x)).
s′(x) =
∂t
∂a
· ∂a
∂x
+
∂t
∂b
· ∂b
∂x
=
f1(x)g(x)− pw(sA(x))f1(x)
(pw)′(s)F1[x] + (pp)′(s)
≥ 0
So s weakly increases.
First, we define uB(y, t) and u˜(y, t) as follows:
uB(y, t) = [y − pw(sA(t))]PB[t]− pp(sA(t))
u˜(y, t) = [y − pw(sA(t))]F1[t]− pp(sA(t))
So uB(y, t) is the follower’s utility with type y and bidding sA(t), Since s weakly increases, we have
PB[t] > F1[t], then uB(y, t) ≥ u˜(y, t). Furthermore maxt uB(y, t) ≥ maxt u˜(y, t). For any t, uB(y, t) =
u˜(y, F−11 [P
∗
B[sA(t)]]), i.e. u˜(y, t) can achieve any value that uB(y, t) achieves. Thus uB(y) = maxt uB(y, t) =
maxt u˜(y, t), to compute uB(y), we only need to focus on u˜(y, t) instead.
Next, we prove that (x, sA(x)) lies on euB(g(x), ·). Consider utility of the follower with value g(x).
Since, leader’s lowest bid is zero(sA(a1) = 0). so the follower bids between the highest and the lowest of
the leader’s bid. Then the derivative ∂u˜∂t should be zero.
∂u˜
∂t
(g(x), t) = [g(x)− pw(s∗A(t))]f1(t)− (pw)′(s∗A(t)) · (s∗A)′(t) · F1[t]
−(pp)′(s∗A(t)) · (s∗A)′(t)
= g(x)f1(t)− g(t)f1(t)
It’s easy to see that maxt u˜(g(x), t) = u˜(g(x), x). Then uB(g(x)) = maxt u˜(y, t) = u˜(g(x), x) = [g(x)−
pw(sA(x))]F1[t]− pp(sA(x)). By definition, (x, sA(x)) lies on euB(g(x), ·).
Let s∗A defined as before based on s. Then sA(x) = euB(g(x), x) ≤ s∗A(x) ≤ sA(x), it must be
sA(x) = s
∗
A(x). That means sA(x) does not change after sorting and smoothing, so M2(s) ∈ O1.
(2) We prove that M1 ◦M2 = I . Suppose otherwise, then there exists g such that M1(M2(g)) = g˜ 6= g.
Let s = M2(g). By Lemma 5.7, we have
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g˜(t)dt = p
w(s∗A(x))F1[x]+p
p(s∗A(x)) On the other side,
by the method used in M2, we have
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt = p
w(s∗A(x))F1[x] + p
p(s∗A(x)) So
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g˜(t)dt =∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt for any x. Since g and g˜ are left continuous, so if there g 6= g˜ for some number x0 then
g 6= g˜ for some interval on the left side of x0. Hence, the equation above will not always hold on that
interval. Contradiction! 2
Proof of Lemma 6.1.
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The leader’s expected utility is∫ a2
a1
{[x− pw(s∗A(x))]F2[g(x)]− pp(s∗A(x))}f1(x)dx
=
∫ a2
a1
{xF2[g(x)]− pw(s∗A(x))F2[g(x)]− pp(s∗A(x))}f1(x)dx
When we function g is fixed, s∗A(a1) becomes smaller, s
∗
A(x) becomes smaller, then we get higher expected
utility. So in the optimal strategy, we must have s∗A(a1) = 0, and s
∗
A(x) is the solution of
∫ x
a1
f1(t)g(t)dt =
pw(s∗A(x))F1[x] + p
p(s∗A(x)) 2
Proof of Theorem 6.2.
(1)Consider the first case, the other case is similar. Otherwise we could always increase function
g(x), x ∈ L a little in the first case and increase the utility. That contradicts to g is optimal.
(2)Create function g˜ that has no image on (0, b1).
g˜(x) =
{
0 g(x) ∈ (0, b1)
g(x) o.w.
g˜ ≤ g(x), then s∗A based on g˜ is smaller than s∗A based on g. While they keep the same winning probability
as long as the winning probability F2[g] is non-zero. So the expected utility weakly increases when using g˜
instead of g. 2
Proof of Lemma 6.4.
By Theorem 6.3, function
t0 = 1
∫ 1
t0
1
x
dx
has a solution t0 ≈ 0.567. When x > t0, we have s∗A(x) = 1F1[x]
∫ x
t0
f1(t)g(t)dt = 1 − t0x The expected
utility is ∫ 1
t0
(x− 1 + t0
x
dx ≈ 0.228
2
B The assumptions are not necessary
The proof idea is that we can achieve the same largest utility with or without assumptions and we prove that
the optimal strategy in different settings are similar.
B.1 Assumption 2.3 is not necessary
Without Assumption 2.3, the follower can give any best response. We prove that the maximal expected
utility of the leader under both Assumptions is same as under only Assumption 2.4.
First, the smooth method does not depend on Assumption 2.3. The proof of Theorem 4.15 does not
depend on Assumption 2.3. From same s, we create same s∗A no matter whether Assumption 2.3 works.
Second, from the proof of Theorem 4.15, we know there are only countable points (x, s∗A(x)) that lies on
multiple eu curves. For the most value x, (x, s∗A(x)) lies on a unique eu curve, and the winning probability is
F2[g(x)] no matter how the follower chooses between his best responses. So for same s∗A, the total expected
utility of the leader under both Assumptions is same as under only Assumption 2.3.
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In conclusion, the optimal strategy of the leader under both Assumptions is same as under only Assump-
tion 2.4. The purpose of Assumption 2.3 is to define winning probability of all the values, not just on most
of the values.
B.2 Assumption 2.4 is not necessary
When considering some other tie-breaking rule rather than always assigning the good to B, our method still
works and the optimal strategy is the same.
We restate our situation, without Assumption 2.3, the follower may choose any best strategy now. We
would like to prove that for arbitrary tie-breaking rule, the optimal strategy is same as the optimal strategy
under Assumption 2.4.
The prove idea is the following:
(1) If tie-breaking rule is assigning the good to A, assume A’s best strategy is s.
(2) If tie-breaking rule is assigning the good to B, A adopts strategy s.
(3) If tie-breaking rule is assigning the good to B, assume A’s best strategy is s˜.
(4) If tie-breaking rule is assigning the good to A, A adopts strategy s˜.
We will prove that the leader’s utility in these four settings has the following order (4) = (3) ≥ (2) = (1).
Hence, s is optimal under arbitrary tie-breaking rule is equivalent to s optimal under Assumption 2.4.
First we should notice that without Assumption 2.4, the follower may not have best response yet. To
ensure the follower choose best response when tie-breaking rule is assign good to A, we create t+ with the
property that
pw(t+) = pw(t)
pp(t+) = pp(t)
PB(t
+) = lim
x→t+
PB(x) x approaches t from the right side, i.e. x > t
x1 < t
+ < x2∀x1 < t < x2
t < t+
Now when we say follower’s best response, we also include the best bid t+. The follower can bid t+ to
represent a bid that arbitrarily approximate the t, but with a weakly higher winning probability than t. Then
in (1), B always has best response. Suppose otherwise B does not have best response with value y, then
there is a series of bid {tn} → t, approaches the largest utility uB(y).
uB(y) = lim(y − pw(tn))PB[tn]− pp(tn)
= (y − pw(lim tn)) limPB[tn]− pp(lim tn)
= (y − pw(t))PB[t]− pp(t) or (y − pw(t+))PB[t+]− pp(t+)
So either t or t+ will become the best response.
Now we start to prove the leader’s utility in (2) and (1) is equal. Wlog, we can assume s is sorted in
weakly increasing order.
Compared to (1), B has advantage in (2), so u(2)B (y) ≥ u(1)B (y). (By u(1)B , we mean the follower’s utility
function in setting (1), others are similar). Here, u(2)B and u
(1)
B denote the follower’s utility respectively in
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(2) and (1). On the other side, the follower could bid t+ in (2) to guarantee the same utility as bidding t in
(1). So we have u(2)B (y) = u
(1)
B (y) and
t ∈ S(2)B (y)⇒ t+ ∈ S(1)B (y) (21)
Here, S(2)B (y),S
(1)
B (y) denote the follower’s best response set respectively in (2) and (1).
Now, we prove that the number of the leader’s value that the winning probability change in (1) and (2),
is countable. Then the expected the leader’s utility between (1) and (2) are same.
Since we introduce t+, we need new version of Theorem 4.4.
Theorem B.1 y1 < y2, if ∃a ∈ S(1)B (y1), b ∈ S(1)B (y2) but a > b, then either a = b+, P (1)B [b+] = P (1)B [b] or
S
(1)
B (y1) ⊆ S(1)B (y2), u(1)B (y1) = u(1)B (y2) = 0, P (1)B [b] = P (1)B [a] = 0.
We ommitted the proof of this theorem, because the proof is exact the same.
When y > yˆ(Recall that yˆ = sup{y|uB(y) = 0}), by this new theorem, SB(y) is still in order. If
yˆ ≤ y1 < y2 then SB(y1) ∩ SB(y2) contains at most two elements, something like t and t+. When y < yˆ,
the follower’s best response is smaller than sA(x),∀x > a1. So it does not matter how the follower chooses
best response when y < yˆ, and we let the follower bid zero. Now we can assume the follower’s bids is
weakly increasing.
Suppose the leader’s winning probability changes with value x. In (1), A wins against B with value
y < y1, and loses against B with value y > y1. In (2), A wins against B with value y < y2, and loses
against B with value y > y2. If we cannot make this supposition, there must exist an interval L and t such
that {t, t+} ⊆ S(1)B (y), y ∈ L, then (x, sA(x)) must lie on multiple eu lines, which has zero affect to the
final expected utility.
Wlog, the supposition is still feasible. There are two cases to consider: y1 < y2 and y1 > y2.
Case 1:y1 < y2
In (2), we have ∃t2 ∈ S(2)B (y2 − ) such that t2 < sA(x). Here  denotes some small enough positive
number. By Equation (21), we have t+2 ∈ S(1)B (y2 − ). In (1), we have t1 ∈ S(1)B (y1 + ) such that
t1 ≥ sA(x).
So we have t+2 < sA(x) ≤ t1, while t+2 ∈ S(1)B (y2 − ) and t1 ∈ S(1)B (y1 + ). By Theorem 4.4, as long
as  is small enough such that y1 +  < y2 − , we get contradiction. So y1 will be never smaller than y2.
Case 2:y1 > y2
In (2), we have ∃t2 ∈ S(2)B (y2 + ) such that t2 ≥ sA(x). Here  denotes some small enough positive
number. By Equation (21), we have sA(x) ≤ t+2 ∈ S(1)B (y2 + ). In (1), we have t1 ∈ S(1)B (y1− ) such that
t1 ≤ sA(x).
Then we have y1 < y2, t2 ≥ t1, t+2 ∈ S(1)B (y1 − ) and t1 ∈ S(1)B (y2 + ). Using same argument as
Theorem 4.4, we have P (1)B [t
+
2 ] = P
(1)
B [t1].
Notice that t2 ≥ sA(x) ≥ t1. If t2 > t1, by Theorem 4.4, we get P (1)B [t+2 ] = P (1)B [t1] = 0. However,
since s is weakly increasing, we have P (1)B [t
+
2 ] ≥ P (1)B [sA(t)+] ≥ F1[t] > 0. Thus t2 = t1 = sA(x). We
also have P (1)B [t
+
2 ] = P
(1)
B [t2], so there is no mass point of A’s bid on t2, i.e. sA(x). Furthermore, we can
conclude among the leader’s value, only A = x bids sA(x). Then P
(2)
B [t2] = P
(2)
B [t2], t2 ∈ S(2)B (y1 − ).
By assumption, we have t2 = t1 ∈ S(2)B (y2 + ). Using Theorem 4.4, we can prove that
S
(2)
B (y) = {t2} = {sA(x)} ∀y ∈ (y2 + , y1 − )
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Because the number of interval is countable, then the number sA(x) corresponds to the interval is countable,
furthermore the number of x with which the leader has different winning probabilities in (1) and (2) is
countable.
(3) ≥ (2) is obvious.
At we talk about (4) = (3). By Lemma 6.1, we have s∗A(a1) = 0. If there is no constant interval in
s∗A, i.e. @x such that s∗A(x) = limt→a1 s∗A(t), then there is no tie problem to concern. So it’s same optimal
strategy whether under Assumption 2.4 or not.
If there is constant interval in s∗A, i.e. xˆ exists. We consider using the same s
∗
A strategy and find the
winning probability of the most leader value, does not change.
When x < xˆ, the leader with value x never wins. In (3) the follower bids zero. In (4), the follower bids
0+. When x > xˆ, for almost all value x, (x, s∗A(x)) lies on a unique eu curve.
When t > 0, we have P (3)B (t) = P
(4)
B (t) = P
(4)
B (t
+), so
t > 0, t ∈ S(3)B (y)⇔ t ∈ S(4)B (y)
Moreover, we have
∀y < g(x) S(3)B (y) = S(4)B (y) < s∗A(x)
∀y > g(x) S(3)B (y) = S(4)B (y) > s∗A(x)
So the winning probability of the leader with value x does not change. So we have (4) = (3).
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